We present the only proof of Pierre Fermat by descente infinie that is known to exist today. We discuss descente infinie from the mathematical, logical, historical, linguistic, and refined logic-historical points of view. We provide the required preliminaries from number theory and present a self-contained proof in a modern form, which nevertheless is intended to follow Fermat's ideas as interpreted into the cited Latin original. We then annotate an English translation of Fermat's original proof with terms from the modern proof. Although the paper consists of reviews, compilations, and simple number theory with mainly pedagogical intentions, its gestalt is original and it fills a gap regarding the easy accessibility of the subject. 
Introduction and Motivation
It seems that-for pedagogical as well as political reasons-myth has to surround the truly paradigmatic figures in the history of science with ficticious association disconnected from the historical facts. Galileo Galilei (1564 Galilei ( -1642 is the primary example for this; cf. Feyerabend (1975) , . But also the most famous mathematician Pierre Fermat is a subject of myth. For instance, on the one hand, one has tried to turn Fermat into a model for mankind, cf. Stephen (1960) . On the other hand, Fermat was accused to be a rogue:
"Actions, however, speak louder than words. The fact that none of the many letters of Fermat which survive gives any real indication of his methods surely means that, consciously or unconsciously, he was very jealous, secretive, and competitive about his work, as were all of his contemporaries." [Edwards (1977) , § 1.6, p.11]
The myth on Fermat even continues with his name and his life time, for a funny collection cf. Goldstein (1995) , § 1. The most famous mathematician Pierre Fermat was born not in 1601 as usually claimed, but either in 1607 or in January 1608. The Pierre Fermat born in 1601 died before his stepbrother, our most famous Pierre Fermat was born. Our Fermat was a competent lawyer and devoted judge of the parlement of Toulouse (conseilleur au parlement de Toulouse), a position which he bought and by which he was admitted the title éculier. Thus, Pierre de Fermat is the address to the noble judge.
The mathematician Pierre Fermat only existed in the very rare leisure time of this most busy judge. What would mathematics be like today if this incredible genius would not have put mathematics behind family, profession, social status, and commerce? For more up-to-date information on Fermat's life we recommend Barner (2001) instead of the better known Mahoney (1994) , as the latter provides reliable information only on the mathematics of Fermat.
All what is important for us here, is that the field of number theory as we know it today, was basically created by the mathematician Pierre Fermat (1607 Fermat ( ?-1665 . He built and improved on Diophantus of Alexandria (3 rd century?), who had looked for rational solutions of a large number of problems in number theory. In number theory, Fermat left the classical association to geometry behind (but was more ingenious than François Viète (1540-1603)) and insisted on integer solutions for the problems. Fermat's mathematical work on number theory seems to have taken place during his very rare leisure time in his easy chair, from which he avoided to get up to fetch paper. Instead, he scribbled his ideas into his copy of Diophantus' Arithmetic in the commented bilingual Greek and Latin edition Diophantus (1621) of Claude Gaspard Bachet de Méziriac (1581 Méziriac ( -1638 . It is not surprising that these notes-intended for the most skilled and ingenious problem-solver Fermat himself to reconstruct his findings-are very short and hard to understand. In his letters to contemporary mathematicians, however, he used to be just as short or even shorter. The reason seems to be that Fermat wanted his correspondents to do number theory on their own and to find out how much fun it is, cf. Mahoney (1994) . Reporting piecemeal on his results and his methods, but hiding his theorems in their most general form and his proofs, he became a most famous but lonely mathematician.
The Method of Descente Infinie is the standard induction method of the working mathematician from the ancient Greeks until today. It got lost in the Middle Ages and was reinvented and named by Fermat, cf. § 2.
Fermat's marginal notes in his copy of Diophantus' Arithmetic were published in 1670 only a few years after his death, and in this paper we will have a look at a text passage of Observation XLV of these Observations on Diophantus; cf. Diophantus (1670), Vol. VI, p. 338f.; Fermat (1891ff.), Vol. I, p. 340f.. This passage contains the only proof of Fermat by the Method of Descente Infinie explicitly known today. Already by this fact, Observation XLV is a most important and precious piece of mathematics. It becomes even more important by the fact that it paradigmatically exemplifies the Method of Descente Infinie and exhibits this method's conceptual aspects and technical problems in a multitude which is truly surprising for such a short text. All in all, Fermat's Observation XLV is the primary example for the Method of Descente Infinie, historically, conceptually, and pedagogically.
As Fermat's original proof is hard to understand, we first have to grasp the mathematical ideas implicitly expressed in this proof. Note that this cognitive process is similar to the interpretation of a music passage from its notes in the following sense: If we perceive a gestalt of the passage, this gestalt will be meaningful, but not necessarily the original one of the author. After projecting our image onto the original passage, we can then evaluate its adequacy. When we look at a text of the 17 th century today, we are very likely to interpret something into it, however, which Fermat's contemporaries would not have done. Nevertheless, I may hope that this paper is not infected by more modern number theory simply for the following reason: I did not do number theory seriously the last twenty years. And I did not use any further material on number theory besides Euclid's Elements, but did everything on my own without getting out of my easy chair. It took me a couple of days, but it was an incredible lot of fun. This indicates that Fermat was right and his contemporaries should not have neglected his challenges; cf. Mahoney (1994) .
My mixed motivations for writing this paper were actually the following:
1. There was no concise presentation of the subjects including all important facts and being easily accessible to laymen in history of mathematics.
2. Regarding Fermat's proof, there was no easily comprehensible self-contained presentation suited for a student in computer science with a minor knowledge in number theory. This paper should enable him to carry out a case study with our inductive theorem proving software system QUODLIBET; cf. Avenhaus &al. (2003) , Wirth (2004) , Wirth (2005) , Schmidt-Samoa (2006a), Schmidt-Samoa (2006b), Schmidt-Samoa (2006c ), Wirth (2006b .
3. I wanted to have fun and to reconstruct a naïve interpretation of Fermat's proof which would have a good chance to be more in the style of the 17 th century than those of mathematicians who are experts in number theory.
4. Moreover, with my expertise in logic and automated theorem proving, I had to clarify some methodological aspects of Descente Infinie and hoped to make some minor contributions to the interpretation of Fermat's proof.
Descente Infinie

Working Mathematician's Point of View
In everyday mathematical practice of an advanced theoretical journal the frequent inductive arguments are hardly ever carried out explicitly. Instead, the proof just reads something like "by structural induction on n, q.e.d." or "by induction on (x, y) over <, q.e.d.", expecting that the mathematically educated reader could easily expand the proof if in doubt. In contrast, very difficult inductive arguments, sometimes covering several pages, such as the proofs of Hilbert's 1 st ε-theorem, Gentzen's Hauptsatz, or confluence theorems such as the ones in Wirth (1995) , Gramlich & Wirth (1996) , Wirth (2006a) still require considerable ingenuity and will be carried out! The experienced mathematician engineers his proof roughly according to the following pattern:
He starts with the conjecture and simplifies it by case analysis. When he realizes that the current goal becomes similar to an instance of the conjecture, he applies the instantiated conjecture just like a lemma, but keeps in mind that he has actually applied an induction hypothesis. Finally, he searches for some well-founded ordering in which all the instances of the conjecture he has applied as induction hypotheses are smaller than the original conjecture itself.
The hard tasks of proof by mathematical induction are (Hypotheses Task) to find the numerous induction hypotheses (as, e.g., in the proof of Gentzen's Hauptsatz on Cut-elimination in Gentzen (1935) ) and (Induction-Ordering Task) to construct an induction ordering for the proof, i.e. a well-founded ordering that satisfies the ordering constraints of all these induction hypotheses in parallel. (For instance, this was the hard part in the elimination of the ε-formulas in the proof of the 1 st ε-theorem in Hilbert & Bernays (1968/70) , Vol. II, and in the proof of the consistency of arithmetic by the ε-substitution method in Ackermann (1940) ).
The soundness of the above method for engineering hard induction proofs is easily seen when the argument is structured as a proof by contradiction, assuming a counterexample. For Fermat's historic reinvention of the method, it is thus just natural that he developed the method itself in terms of assumed counterexamples. 
Logical Point of View
At Fermat's time, natural language was still the predominant tool for expressing terms and equations in mathematical writing, and it was too early for a formal axiomatization. Moreover, carefully notice that an axiomatization captures only validity, but in general does neither induce a method of proof search nor provide the data structures required to admit both a formal treatment and a human-oriented proof search. The formalizable logic part, however, of descente infinie can be expressed in what is called the (second-order) Theorem of Noetherian Induction (N), after Emmy Noether . This is not to be confused with the Axiom of Structural Induction, which is generically given for any inductively defined data structure, such as the Axiom of Structural Induction (S) for the natural numbers inductively defined by the constructors zero 0 and successor s. Moreover, we need the definition (Wellf(<)) of well-foundedness of a relation <.
, which implies the well-foundedness of the ordering of the natural numbers. The natural numbers can be specified up to isomorphism either by (S), (nat2), and (nat3), or else by Wellf(s) and (nat1). The first alternative is the traditional one, following Dedekind and named after Peano. As the instances for P and < in (N) are often still easy to find when the instances for P in (S) are not, the second alternative together with (N) is to be preferred in theorem proving for its usefulness and elegance. Cf. Wirth (2004) for more on this.
The proposition Γ of § 2.1 is represented in (N) by ∀x. P (x). Roughly speaking, a counterexample for Γ is an instance a for which ¬P (a) holds, but we should be more careful here because this is actually a semantical notion and not a syntactical one; cf. Wirth (2004) , § 2.3.2. To treat counterexamples properly, a logic that actually models the mathematical process of proof search by descente infinie itself and directly supports it with the data structures required for a formal treatment requires a semantical treatment of free variables. The only such logic can be found in Wirth (2004) .
Historical Point of View
Early Greek History
Although we do not have any original Greek mathematical documents from the 5 th century B.C. and only fragments from the following millennium, the first known occurrence of descente infinie in history seems to be the proof of the irrationality of the golden number 1 2 (1+ √ 5) by the Pythagorean mathematician Hippasus of Metapontum (Italy) in the middle of the 5 th century B.C., cf. Fritz (1945) . This proof is carried out geometrically in a pentagram, where the golden number gives the proportion of the length of a line to the length of the side of the enclosing pentagon:
Under the assumption that this proportion is given by m : n with natural numbers m and n, it can be shown that the proportion of the length of a line of a new pentagram drawn inside the inscribed pentagon to the length of the side of this pentagon is m−n : 2n−m, with 0 ≺ m−n ≺ m, and so forth since the new inscribed pentagram is similar to the original one. A myth says that the gods drowned Hippasus in the sea, as a punishment for destroying the Pythagoreans' belief that everything is given by positive rational numbers; and this even with the pentagram, which was the Pythagoreans' sign of recognition amongst themselves. The resulting confusion seems to have been one of the reasons for the ancient Greek culture to shift interest in mathematics from theorems to proofs.
Euclid's Elements
Proof by Generalizable Example In the famous collection "Elements" of Euclid of Alexandria (ca. 300 B.C.), we find several occurrences of descente infinie. In the Elements, the verbalization of a proof by descente infinie has the form of a generalizable example in the sense that a special concrete counterexample is considered-instead of an arbitrary one-but the existence of a smaller counterexample is actually shown independently of this special choice. Similarly, the induction step of a structural induction may also be presented in the form of a generalizable example. Such proofs via a generalizable example are called quasi-general in Freudenthal (1953) . We would not accept a quasi-general proof as a proper proof from our students today because the explicit knowledge and the explicit verbalization of methods of mathematical induction have become standard during the last centuries. And we may ask why the Elements proceed by generalizable examples. For this question it is interesting to see that already in a text of Plato (427-347 B.C.) (Athens) we find a proof by structural induction with a proper verbalization of a general induction step without resorting to generalizable examples, cf. Acerbi (2000) . As the theorem of this proof is mathematically trivial ("n+1 terms in a list have n contacts"), the intention of this proof seems to be the explicit demonstration of the activity of structural induction itself, though no instance of the Axiom of Structural Induction (S) is explicitly mentioned. Moreover, the verbalization of a variable number and even the comprehension of a non-concrete example and a general induction proof seems to have been a challenge for an ancient Greek student; cf. Unguru (1991) , p. 279ff.. Thus, the presentation of induction proofs via generalizable examples in the Elements may well have had pedagogical reasons.
Let us have a look at two proofs from the Elements.
Proof by Descente Infinie In Euclid (ca. 300 B.C.), Vol. VII, Proposition 31, we find the following proof by descente infinie: Proposition VII.31: Any composite number is measured by some prime number. Proof of Proposition VII.31: Let A be a composite number. I say that A is measured by some prime number. Since A is composite, therefore some number B measures it. Now, if B is prime, then that which was proposed is done. But if it is composite, some number measures it. Let a number C measure it. Then, since C measures B, and B measures A, therefore C also measures A. And, if C is prime, then that which was proposed is done. But if it is composite, some number measures it. Thus, if the investigation is continued in this way, then some prime number will be found which measures the number before it, which also measures A. If it is not found, then an infinite sequence of numbers measures the number A, each of which is less than the other, which is impossible in numbers. Therefore some prime number will be found which measures the one before it, which also measures A.
Q.e.d. (Proposition VII.31)
Proof by Structural Induction Taking into account that the ancient Greeks were not familiar with an actually infinite set of natural numbers, in accordance with Freudenthal (1953) I consider the proof of Proposition IX.8 of the Elements to be obviously a proof by structural induction, whereas Unguru (1991) rejects this opinion and Acerbi (2000) even claims that there are no proofs by structural induction in Euclid's Elements at all. Thus, let us have a look at this proof to give the reader a chance to judge on his own.
Proposition IX.8: If as many numbers as we please beginning from a unit are in continued proportion, then the third from the unit is square as are also all those which successively leave out one, and the fourth is cubic as are also all those which leave out two, and the seventh is both cubic and square as are also all those which leave out five. Proof of Proposition IX.8: Let there be as many numbers as we please, A, B, C, D, E, and F , beginning from a unit and in continued proportion. I say that B, the third from the unit, is square as are all those which leave out one; C, the fourth, is cubic as are all those which leave out two; and F , the seventh, is both cubic and square as are all those which leave out five. Since the unit is to A as A is to B, therefore the unit measures the number A the same number of times that A measures B. But the unit measures the number A according to the units in it, therefore A also measures B according to the units in A. Therefore A multiplied by itself makes B, therefore B is square. And, since B, C, and D are in continued proportion, and B is square, therefore D is also square. For the same reason F is also square. Similarly we can prove that all those which leave out one are square. I say next that C, the fourth from the unit, is cubic as are also all those which leave out two. Since the unit is to A as B is to C, therefore the unit measures the number A the same number of times that B measures C. But the unit measures the number A according to the units in A, therefore B also measures C according to the units in A. Therefore A multiplied by B makes C. Since then A multiplied by itself makes B, and multiplied by B makes C, therefore C is cubic. And, since C, D, E, and F are in continued proportion, and C is cubic, therefore F is also cubic. But it was also proved square, therefore the seventh from the unit is both cubic and square. Similarly we can prove that all the numbers which leave out five are also both cubic and square. Q.e.d. (Proposition IX.8)
Recovering from the Dark Middle Ages
After Euclid, in the following eighteen centuries until Fermat, I do not know of descente infinie (except that Euclid's Elements where copied again and again), but of structural induction only. (2000), p. 57.
Revival
In the 1650s Pascal exchanged letters on probability theory and descente infinie with Pierre Fermat (1607?-1665) (Toulouse), who was the first to describe the Method of Descente Infinie explicitly. François Viète (1540-1603) (Paris) had already given a new meaning to the word analysis by extending the analysis of concrete mathematical problems to the algebraic analysis of the process of their solution. Fermat improved on Viète:
Instead of a set of rules that sometimes did find a single solution to the "double equations" of Diophantus of Alexandria (3 rd century?) and sometimes did not, he invented a method to enumerate an infinite set of solutions described in the "Inventum Novum" by the number theoretician Jacques 
Linguistic and Refined Logic-Historical Point of View
The level of abstraction of our previous discussion of descente infinie is well-suited for the description of the structure of mathematical proof search in two-valued logics, where the difference between a proof by contradiction and a positive proof of a given theorem is only a linguistic one and completely disappears when we formalize these proofs in a state-of-the-art modern logic calculus, such as the one of Wirth (2004) . An investigation into the history of mathematics, however, also has to consider the linguistic representation and the exact logical form of the presentation.
An Inappropriate Refinement by Unguru and Acerbi
Such a linguistic and logic-historical refinement can easily go over the top. For instance, from the above-mentioned fact that we find-for the first time in known history-a correct verbalization of the related instance of the Axiom of Structural Induction (S) in Pascal's publications, it is not sound to conclude that Pascal was the first to do structural induction (as claimed in Unguru (1991) ) or the first to do it consciously (as claimed in Acerbi (2000)). These claims are just as abstruse to most working mathematicians as the claim that Fermat was the first to do descente infinie. And Fowler (1994) is perfectly right to object to this view on the basis of a deeper understanding of the mathematical activity, although we have to be careful not to interpret modern thinking into the historical texts.
Mathematics is mostly a top-down procedure and when we do not formalize and explicate every bit of it, we may have good reasons and be well aware of what we do. Human mathematical activity includes subconscious elements, but this does not mean that their application is unconscious. Just as music is not captured by notes and not necessarily invented as notes, mathematical activity cannot be captured by its formalization and is not necessarily well-expressed in natural or formal language. (Actually, formalization is a dangerous step for a mathematician because afterwards there is hardly any way back to his original intuition.)
Our Suggestion for an Unproblematic Classification Scheme
All in all, for our subject here there is actually no need to discuss the working mathematician's consciousness: It suffices to speak of 1. quasi-general proofs (i.e. proofs by generalizable examples), 2. general proofs (i.e. proofs we would accept from our students in an examination today), 3. proofs with an explicit statement of the related instance of an induction axiom or theorem, and 4. proofs with an explicit statement of an induction axiom or theorem itself.
An Appropriate Refinement by Paolo Bussotti
Nevertheless, there is evidence that such a linguistic and logic-historical refinement is necessary to understand the fine structure of historical reasoning in mathematics. For instance, in Euclid's Elements, Proposition VIII.7 is just the contrapositive of Proposition VIII.6, and this is just one of several cases that we find a proposition with a proof in the Elements, where today we just see a corollary. Moreover, even Fermat reported in his letter for Huygens (cf. § 2.3) that he had had problems to apply the Method of Descente Infinie to positive mathematical statements. "For a long time I was not able to apply my method to affirmative conjectures because the ways and means of achieving this are much more complicated than the ones I am used to for negative conjectures. So that, when I had to show that any prime number which exceeds 1 by a multiple of 4 is the sum of two squares, I found myself pretty much in trouble. But finally oft-repeated meditation gave me the insight I lacked, and affirmative questions yielded to my method with the aid of some new principles which had to be added to it." (our translation)
Due to the work of Frege and Peano, these logical differences may be considered trivial today. Nevertheless, they were not trivial before, and to understand the history of mathematics and the fine structure in which mathematicians reasoned, the distinction between affirmative and negative theorems and between direct and apagogic methods of demonstration is important.
Therefore, it is well justified when in Bussotti (2006) , following the above statement of Fermat, the Method of Descente Infinie is subdivided into indefinite descent (ID) and reduction-descent (RD):
Actually the Wellf(<) does not occur in Bussotti (2006) because for Fermat the Method of Descente infinie was actually restricted to the well-founded ordering of the natural numbers.
Although (N), (ID), and (RD) are logically equivalent in two-valued logics, according to Bussotti (2006) descente infinie does not subsume proofs by Noetherian or structural induction. This is in opposition to our more coarse-grained discussion above. With this fine-grained distinction, on p. 2 of Bussotti (2006) we find the surprising claim that there is only a single proof by indefinite descent in the whole Elements, namely the above-cited Proof of Proposition VII.31. Indeed, at least all those proofs in the Elements besides VII.31 which I reexamined and which proceed by mathematical induction, actually proceed by reduction-descent or structural induction, but not by indefinite descent: The correctness proofs of the Euclidian Algorithm (Proposition VII.2 and Proposition X.3) are reduction-descents with a horrible linguistic surface structure. Similarly, the proofs of Propositions IX.12 and IX.13 are reduction-descents with superfluous sentences confusing the proof idea.
Notice that, as already repeatedly expressed above, a logical formalization cannot capture a mathematical method. Moreover, as also already expressed above for Noetherian and structural induction, logical equivalence of formulas does not imply the equivalence of the formalized methods. For an interesting discussion of this difficult subject cf. Bussotti (2006) , Chapter 7.
Nevertheless, (N), (ID), and (RD) sketch methods of proof search equivalent for the working mathematician of today. Indeed: (ID)-roughly speaking-is the contrapositive of (N), which means that in two-valued logics the methods only differ in verbalization. Moreover, a proof by (ID) is a proof by (RD) when we set S to the empty predicate. Finally, a proof by (RD) can be transformed into a proof by (ID) as follows: Suppose we have proofs for the statements in the conjunction of the premise of (RD). The proofs of ∀u. S(u) ⇒ P (u) and ∀v.
¬S
give a proof of ∀v.
.
Instantiating the P in (ID) via {P → λz. (S(z) ∨ P (z))}, the latter proof can be schematically transformed into a proof of ∀x. (S(x) ∨ P (x)) by (ID). And then from the proof of ∀u. S(u) ⇒ P (u) again, we get a proof of ∀x. P (x), as intended. Thus, in any case, the resulting proof does not significantly differ in the mathematical structure from the original one.
Notice that this is contrary to the case of Noetherian vs. structural induction, where the only transformation I see from the former to the latter (the other direction is trivial, cf. Wirth (2004) , § 1.1.3) is to show that the axiom (S) implies Wellf(s), and then leave the application of (N) unchanged. This transformation, however, is not complete because it does not remove the application of (N), which is a theorem anyway.
All in all, this shows that-while structural and Noetherian induction vastly differ in practical applicability-for a working mathematician today it is not important for his proof search to be aware of the differences between Noetherian induction (N), indefinite descent (ID), and reduction-descent (RD). And thus, we will continue to subsume all the three under the Method of Descente Infinie.
A Further Refinement
For the soundness of Walsh's interpretation of Fermat's proof in our § 4.5, we have to invent the following further refinement to the logic-historical discussion of descente infinie.
The predicate P in the theorem (ID) of § 2.4.3 may actually vary in the indefinite descent, in the sense that-for a function P from natural numbers to predicates-we have the following theorem:
For a sufficiently expressible logic, this again makes no difference: Indeed, to prove theorem (ID ′ ) and even to use theorem (ID) instead of it without a significant change of the structure of the proof, it suffices to instantiate theorem (ID) according to
Typically-as in the example of § 4.5-the set { P i | i ∈ N } is finite. In this case, the universal quantification in ∀i ∈ N. P i (x) can be replaced with a finite conjunction.
Prerequisites from Number Theory
In this § 3, we list the propositions and the proofs that I found in my easy chair without any help but Euclid's Elements.
If the reader is experienced in number theory or wants to have the pleasure of doing some exercises in elementary number theory on his own, he should skip this § 3 and continue directly with § 4. Moreover, we generally recommend to skip this § 3 on a first reading.
As expressed already in § 1, we hope that the reconstruction of elementary number theory in this § 3 and of Fermat's proof in § 4 are not different in spirit from what Fermat's contemporary mathematicians could have achieved if Fermat had been able to interest them in his new number theory. We follow the Elements very closely, but occasionally deviated from them if an alternative course is more efficient. Moreover, as addressed to modern readers, the language of our presentation is, however, a modern one, most untypical for the 17 th century.
From the Elements, Vol. VII
Let all variables range over the set of natural numbers N (including 0), unless indicated otherwise. Let '≺' denote the ordering on N. Let N + := { n ∈ N | 0 = n }. Proof of Lemma 3.5 Let y 0 be minimal such that there is a y 1 ∈ N + with x 0 y 1 = y 0 x 1 . Then we have y 0 ∈ N + . Thus, if y 0 , y 1 were not coprime, there would be some k 2 and y Claim 1: For z 0 , z 1 :
Proof of Claim 1: We show the "only if"-direction, the "if"-direction is symmetric.
Let z 0 be minimal such that there is a z 1 ∈ N + with y 0 z 1 = z 0 y 1 . By Claim 1 z 0 is also minimal such that there is a z 1 ∈ N + with x 0 z 1 = z 0 x 1 . By Lemma 3.5, there are k x , k y ∈ N + such that k y z i = y i and k x z i = x i . Thus, k y | y i . As y 0 , y 1 are coprime, we have k y = 1. Thus, Proof of Lemma 3.10 For m = 0, the lemma holds as 1 is the minimal element of the reflexive ordering | according to Corollary 3.2. Thus, suppose the lemma holds for arbitrary m to show that it holds for m+1. If there is some i ∈ {1, . . . , m+1} with x i = 0, then we have z = 1, and the lemma holds. In case of z = 0, we have x i = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and the lemma holds again. Thus we may assume x 0 , . . . , x m+1 , z ∈ N + . Assume u | m+1 i=1 x i and u | z. By the first there is some k ′ with x m+1 m i=1 x i = k ′ u and k ′ , u ∈ N + . By the second, by x m+1 , z being coprime, and by Lemma 3.9, we get that x m+1 , u are coprime. Thus, by Lemma 3.8, there is some 
Proof of Lemma 3.11 For m+n = 0, the lemma holds as 1 is the minimal element of the reflexive ordering | according to Corollary 3.2. Thus, suppose the lemma holds for arbitrary m+n to show that it holds for m+n+1. By symmetry, we may assume that x i , y j are coprime for i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n+1}. By Lemma 3.10 y n+1 , m i=1 x i are coprime. By induction hypothesis, 
Definition 3.13 (Prime)
A number p is prime if p = 1 and (x | p) ⇒ x ∈ {1, p} for all x.
Lemma 3.14 (Euclid's Elements, Proposition VII.29)
If p is prime and p ∤ x, then p, x are coprime.
Proof of Lemma 3.14 Assume k | p and k | x. As p is prime, we have k ∈ {1, p}. As p ∤ x, we have k = p. Thus, k = 1.
Q.e.d. (Lemma 3.14)
The following lemma is popular today under the label of "Euclid's Lemma":
Lemma 3.15 (Euclid's Elements, Proposition VII.30) If p is prime and p
| x 1 x 2 , then p | x 1 or p | x 2 .
Proof of Lemma 3.15
We may assume p ∤ x 1 and x 0 , x 1 ∈ N + . Then p, x 1 are coprime by Lemma 3.14. Due to p | x 1 x 2 , there is some k with kp = x 1 x 2 . Then k ∈ N + . By Lemma 3.8, we get p | x 2 .
Q.e.d. (Lemma 3.15)
The following lemma will be applied exclusively in the Proofs of Lemmas 3.21, 3.24, and 3.26.
Lemma 3.16 (Euclid's Elements, Proposition VII.31)
For any x = 1, there is some prime p such that p | x.
Proof of Lemma 3.16
We show this by descente infinie, more precisely by indefinite descent: Suppose that there is some x = 1 not divided by any prime. We look for an x ′ = 1 not divided by any prime with x ′ ≺ x. As the relation | is reflexive and has maximum 0 according to Corollary 3.2, x is not prime and x 2. Thus, there must be some x ′ / ∈ {1, x} with x ′ | x. As the relation | is transitive according to Corollary 3.2, x ′ is not divided by any prime. Moreover, there is a k such that kx ′ = x. From x 2 and x ′ ∈ {1, x}, we thus get k 2 and x ′ 2. Thus, 
Proof of Lemma 3.18
Claim 1: x 0 y i = y 0 x i and x i−1 y i = y i−1 x i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n+1}.
Proof of Claim 1: For i = 1 this holds by assumption of the lemma. Suppose it holds for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then
From Claim 1 we get x 0 y n+1 = y 0 x n+1 . As x 0 , x n+1 are coprime, by Lemma 3.8 there is some k ∈ N + with kx i = y i for i ∈ {0, n+1}. By Claim 1 this holds for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n+1} due to
Q.e.d. (Lemma 3.18) Lemma 3.19 (Euclid's Elements, Proposition VIII.2, generalized)
If x 0 , . . . , x n+1 are in continued proportion, then there are k ∈ N + and coprime y, z ∈ N + such that y n+1 z 0 , . . . , y n+1−i z i , . . . , y 0 z n+1 are in continued proportion, too, x 0 (y n z 1 ) = (y n+1 z 0 )x 1 , ky n+1−i z i = x i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n+1}, and, moreover, in case that x 0 , x n+1 are coprime, k = 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.19
Let y be minimal with x 0 z = yx 1 for some z ∈ N + . By Lemma 3.5, y ∈ N + , y, z are coprime, and there is some k ′ ∈ N + with k ′ y = x 0 and k ′ z = x 1 . Thus,
. . , y 0 z n+1 are in continued proportion. By Corollary 3.12, y n+1 , z n+1 are coprime, too. Applying Lemma 3.18, we get a k ∈ N + with ky n+1−i z i = x i . In case that x 0 , x n+1 are coprime, we get by Lemma 3.18 a
Q.e.d. (Lemma 3.19)
The following lemma will be applied exclusively in the Proofs of Lemmas 3.21 and 3.22.
Lemma 3.20
If p is prime and p m | x 0 x 1 , then there are n 0 and n 1 such that m = n 0 +n 1 , p n 0 | x 0 , and p n 1 | x 1 .
Proof of Lemma 3.20
We show this by descente infinie over m, more precisely by indefinite descent. Let p be prime. Suppose that p m | x 1 x 2 , but there are no n 1 and n 2 such that m = n 1 +n 2 , p n 1 | x 1 , and p n 2 | x 2 . Then m, x 0 , x 1 ∈ N + . By Lemma 3.15, there is an i ∈ {0, 1} such that p | x i . Thus, there is some x The following lemma will be applied exclusively in the Proof of Lemma 3.22.
Proof of Lemma 3.21
The "only if"-direction follows directly from the transitivity according to Corollary 3.2. We show the other direction by descente infinie, more precisely by indefinite descent: Suppose that there are x, y such that ∀p prime. ∀n ∈ N + . (p n | x) ⇒ (p n | y) , but x ∤ y. We find x ′ , y ′ of the same kind with y ′ ≺ y. According to Corollary 3.2, we have x = 1 and y = 0. By Lemma 3.16, there is some prime p such that p | x. Then we have p | y by our assumption, setting n := 1. Thus, we have y 2. Moreover, there is some y ′ ∈ N + with y ′ p = y. Thus y ′ ≺ y. Moreover, there is some x ′ with x ′ p = x. Then x ′ ∤ y ′ . It suffices to show that for any prime number q and any n ∈ N + with q 
Proof of Lemma 3.22
The "only if"-direction is trivial. For the "if"-direction we do not present the proof found in the Elements because this recursively requires a large number of additional propositions. Assume x 2 | y 2 and p n | x for arbitrary prime number p and n ∈ N + . By Lemma 3.21 it suffices to show p n | y. But from p n | x we get p 2n | x 2 , and then p 2n | y 2 . By Lemma 3.20, we get p n | y. 
Proof of Lemma 3.24
The "if"-direction is trivial. For the "only if"-direction let us assume that l 1 , . . . , l n are not coprime. Then there is some x = 1 such that x | l i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 3.16 there is some prime number p with p | x. By transitivity of | according to Corollary 3.2, we get p | l i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Q.e.d. (Lemma 3.24)
Lemma 3.25 Let a, b be coprime. Let p be a prime number.
(1) Either pa, b are coprime or a, pb are coprime.
(2) If pab = v 2 for some v, then there are m ∈ N and k ∈ N + such that pm, k are coprime and {pm 2 , k 2 } = {a, b}.
Proof of Lemma 3.25
(1): Suppose neither pa, b nor a, pb coprime. By Lemma 3.24 there are two prime numbers x, y with x | pa, x | b, y | a, y | pb. As a, b coprime, x ∤ a. As x is prime, by Lemma 3.15 we get x | p and thus x = p, as p is prime. Similarly we get y = p. Thus p | b and p | a, contradicting being a, b being coprime.
(2): If pa, b are coprime, they must be squares due to Lemma 3.23, say pa = l 2 and b = k 2 . By Lemma 3.15, there is some m with pm = l, i.e. a = pm 2 . By Lemma 3.9, pm, k are coprime. Thus, k ∈ N + because pm = 1. Moreover, {pm 2 , k 2 } = {a, b}. Similarly, if a, pb are coprime, they must be squares due to Lemma 3.23, say a = k 2 and pb = l 2 . By Lemma 3.15, there is some m with pm = l, i.e. b = pm 2 . Then again we have k ∈ N + , pm, k are coprime, and {pm 2 , k 2 } = {a, b}. (1) x | 2a and x | 2b.
(2) If a, b are coprime, then x 2.
Proof of Lemma 3.26
(1): By Corollary 3.3 we get x | (a+b) ± (a−b), i.e. x | 2a and x | 2b.
(2): By (1) we have x | 2a and x | 2b. Assume x ≻ 2 to show a contradiction. If 2 | x, then there is some k 2 with 2k = x, and then we have k | a and k | b, contradicting a, b being coprime. Otherwise, if 2 ∤ x, then by Lemma 3.16 there is some prime number p ≻ 2 with p | x. Then p | 2a. By Lemma 3.15 we get p | a. Similarly p | b. This again contradicts a, b being coprime.
Q.e.d. (Lemma 3.26)
The following lemma will be applied exclusively in the Proof of Lemma 3.28.
Lemma 3.27 If p q and x
Proof of Lemma 3.27 As x 2 | 4p 2 q 2 by Lemma 3.22, the following are logically equivalent by Corollary 3.3 and Lemma 3.22: 2 and x | 2q 2 . As p, q are coprime, one of them is odd. Thus, one of pq and p 2 ∓q 2 is odd. Thus, x = 2. Thus, as x is prime, we have x ∤ 2. By Lemma 3.15, we get x | p 2 and x | q 2 , and then x | p and x | q, contradicting p, q being coprime. is not a square. Thus, there is some i ∈ {0, 1} and some c with x i = 2c. But then x 2 ±x 1−i must be even too,
2 means that one of them must be even by Lemma 3.15, and then the other is even, too. Thus, there are a, b such that x 2 +x 1−i = 2a and x 2 −x 1−i = 2b. This implies 2x 2 = 2a+2b, 2x 1−i = 2a−2b, and 2a2b = 4c 2 , and then x 2 = a+b, x 1−i = a−b, and ab = c 2 .
Q.e.d. (Lemma 3.29)
Note that in Lemma 3.29 we cannot require any of a and b to be a square in general. For instance, for x 0 = 12 ∧ x 1 = 9 ∧ x 2 = 15, we have
2 , but necessarily get √ ab = 6 (as x 1 is odd), and then, if any of a or b is a square, we have (a = 9 ∧ b = 4) ∨ (a = 36 ∧ b = 1), i.e. (x 2 = 13 ∧ x 1 = 5) ∨ (x 2 = 37 ∧ x 1 = 35), which are Pythagorean triangles not similar to the original x 2 = 15 ∧ x 1 = 9. But a = 12 ∧ b = 3 provide the generators for x 0 = 12 ∧ x 1 = 9 ∧ x 2 = 15, whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 3.29.
If x 0 , x 1 , x 2 are coprime, however, then a, b must be coprime (as (y | a) ∧ (y | b) ⇒ ∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. (y | x i )) and one even and one odd (as otherwise ∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. (2 | x i )). And then they must be squares due to x i = 2 √ ab and Lemma 3.23; say a = p 2 and b = q 2 . Then p, q are coprime and one even and one odd, too. All in all, we get as a corollary of Lemma 3.29:
2 and x 0 , x 1 , x 2 are coprime, then, for some i ∈ {0, 1}, there are coprime p, q such that one of them is odd and one of them is even, p ≻ q, x i = 2pq, x 1−i = p 2 −q 2 , and x 2 = p 2 +q 2 .
Note that in Corollary 3.30 we cannot require q ∈ N + because for the case of (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) = (1, 0, 1) we have
2 and x 0 , x 1 , x 2 are coprime, but i ∈ {0, 1}, p ≻ q, x i = 2pq,
, and x 2 = p 2 +q 2 implies q = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 3.31 By Corollary 3.30, there are i ∈ {0, 1} and coprime p, q such that one of them is odd and one of them is even, p ≻ q, x i = 2pq, x 1−i = p 2 −q 2 , and x 2 = p 2 +q 2 . We have assumed x 0 to be the even one in {x 0 , x 1 }, i.e. i = 0. Thus, 2pq = v 2 . By Lemma 3.25(2), there are m ∈ N and k ∈ N + such that 2m, k are coprime and {2m 2 , k 2 } = {p, q}. Moreover the following are logically equivalent:
Q If x 0 , x 1 , x 2 are coprime, however, then a, b must be coprime. By Lemma 3.25(2), then there are m ∈ N and k ∈ N + such that 2m, k are coprime and {2m 2 , k 2 } = {a, b}. All in all, we get as a corollary of Lemma 3.32: 
, and x 2 = 2m 2 +k 2 .
Note that in Corollary 3.33 we cannot require m ∈ N + because for the case of (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) = (1, 0, 1) we have x 2 0 + 2x
2 and x 0 , x 1 , x 2 are coprime, but x 2 = 2m 2 +k 2 implies m = 0.
Fermat's Proof
Fermat's Theorem of Observation XLV simply says that the area of a Pythagorean triangle with positive integer side lengths is not the square of an integer, or in modern formulation: Note in Theorem 4.1 we cannot admit 0 ∈ {x 0 , x 1 } because we have 
Fermat's Original Proof
Eodem ratiocinio dabitur et minor ista inventa per viam prioris, et semper in infinitum minores invenientur numeri in integris idem praestantes: Quod impossibile est, quia, dato numero quovis integro, non possunt dari infiniti in integris illo minores.
Demonstrationem integram et fusius explicatam inserere margini vetat ipsius exiguitas.
Note that the separation into paragraphs is not original, but intended to simplify the comparison with the English translation in § 4.3, which follows the same separation into paragraphs. Moreover, we have omitted the beginning and the end of Observation XLV, which state the theorem and that it is proved indeed, respectively.
A Simple Self-Contained Modern Proof of Theorem 4.1
We show Theorem 4.1 by descente infinie: Assuming the existence of x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 with x 0 , x 1 ∈ N + and x First, let us consider the case that there is some prime number z that divides x 0 , x 1 , i.e. that there are y i with x i = zy i for i ∈ {0, 1}. Then we have z 2 (y 2 0 + y
. By Lemma 3.22, we get z | x 2 . Thus, there is some y 2 ∈ N + with x 2 = zy 2 . Then we also have z 2 (y . From x i ∈ N + we get y i ∈ N + for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Finally, we have y 2 ≺ x 2 , which finishes this case by descente infinie.
Thus, we may assume x 0 , x 1 to be coprime by Lemma 3.24, and-a fortiori-x 0 , x 1 , x 2 to be coprime, too.
Claim I: There are coprime p, q such that one of them is odd and one of them is even, p ≻ q, and there are some c, e, f with x 2 ≻ e ≻ f ≻ 0 such that p = e 2 , q = f 2 , and p 2 −q 2 = c 2 .
Proof of Claim I: By Corollary 3.30 there are coprime p and q such that one of them is odd and one of them is even and, for some i ∈ {0, 1}, p ≻ q, x i = 2pq, x 1−i = p 2 −q 2 , and x 2 = p 2 +q 2 . Due to x i ∈ N + , we have p, q ∈ N + . From x 0 x 1 = 2x 2 3 , we get 2pq(p 2 −q 2 ) = 2x 2 3 , i.e. pq(p 2 −q 2 ) = x 2 3 . By Lemma 3.28, we know that pq and p 2 −q 2 are coprime, too. Thus, by Lemma 3.23 there must be some coprime b, c ∈ N + with x 3 = bc, pq = b 2 , and p 2 −q 2 = c 2 . By the coprimality of p, q, due to pq = b 2 , by Lemma 3.23 there must be some coprime e, f ∈ N + with b = ef , p = e 2 , and q = f 2 . Moreover e ≻ f ≻ 0, as e f would imply the contradictory p q. Furthermore, from q ∈ N + , we get
Q.e.d. (Claim I)
Claim II: There are coprime g, h ∈ N + and some e, f with x 2 ≻ e ≻ f ≻ 0 such that e 2 +f 2 = g 2 and e 2 −f 2 = h 2 .
Proof of Claim II: Note we will not use any information on the current proof state besides Claim I here. By Claim I, p+q, p−q ∈ N + . By Claim I and Lemma 3.26(2), the only prime that may divide both p+q and p−q is 2; but this is not the case because one of p, q is even and one is odd. Thus, by Lemma 3.24, p+q, p−q are coprime and due to (p+q)(p−q) = p 2 −q 2 = c 2 , by Lemma 3.23, there are coprime g, h ∈ N + with c = gh, p+q = g 2 , p−q = h 2 . Q.e.d. (Claim II) As in Fermat's original proof the induction hypothesis is not Theorem 4.1, but Claim II, let us forget anything about the current proof state but Claim II here. The following two Claims are trivial in the context of Claim II:
Claim IIb: h 2 +f 2 = e 2 .
As g, h are coprime, h, f, g are coprime, too. Thus, by Claim IIa and Corollary 3.33, there are m, k such that 2m, k coprime, h = |2m 2 −k 2 | , f = 2mk, and g = 2m 2 +k 2 . Set y 0 :=2m 2 , y 1 :=k 2 , y 2 :=e, y 3 :=mk. By Claim II we have x 2 ≻ y 2 ≻ 0. As f ∈ N + , we have m, k ∈ N + , and y 0 , y 1 , y 3 ∈ N + . Moreover, we have y 0 y 1 = 2y 2 3 , g = y 0 +y 1 , and f 2 = 2y 0 y 1 . Finally, by Claim IIa and Claim IIb, we have y 2 0 +y Hence, this right triangle is composed of two squares of which the sum and difference are squares. But these two squares will be proved to be smaller than the first squares initially posited, of which the sum as well as the difference also made squares: therefore, if two squares are given of which the sum and the difference are squares, there exists in integers the sum of two squares of the same nature, less than the former [e 2 +f 2 ].
[Finally Fermat illustrates the Method of Descente Infinie.] By the same argument there will be given in the prior manner another one less than this, and smaller numbers will be found indefinitely having the same property. Which is impossible, because, given any integer, one cannot give an infinite number of integers less than it. "S'il y avoit aucun triangle rectangle en nombres entiers qui eût son aire égale a un quarré, il y auroit un autre triangle moindre que celui-là, qui auroit la même propriété. S'il y en avoit un second, moindre que le premier, qui eût la même propriété, il y en auroit, par un pareil raisonnement, un troisième, moindre que le second, qui auroit la même propriété, et enfin un quatrième, un cinquième, &c. à l'infini en descendant." [Fermat (1891ff.) , Vol. 1, p. 431f.]
"If there were any right-angled triangle in whole numbers that had its area equal to a square, there would be another [right-angled] triangle smaller than that one, which would have the same property. If there were a second, smaller than the first, which had the same property, there would be, by a similar reasoning, a third, smaller than the second, which would have the same property, and finally a fourth, a fifth, &c., descending to infinity." (our translation)
Similar Interpretations of the Proof in the Literature
My naïve interpretation of Fermat's proof being completed, it is now time to have a look into the literature of its interpretation. The interpretation of Fermat's proof in Dickson (1919ff.) , Vol. 2, p. 615f., (looked up only after my interpretation was already completed) is roughly similar to my interpretation, but a little less structured and less similar to Fermat's original proof. The interpretation of the proof in Edwards (1977) , § 1.6, (looked up only after my interpretation was already completed) claims to follow Dickson (1919ff.) [Edwards (1977) , § 1.6, p. 13]
The most brief interpretation of the proof in Weil (1984) , Chapter X, (looked up only after my interpretation was already completed) is quite in accordance with my interpretation when we apply the substitution {x →e, y →f, u →g, v →h, z →c, r →k, s →m} to Weil's interpretation.
The interpretation of the proof in Mahoney (1994), Chapter VI.VI, is less brief, but mathematically strange in the sense that there are some steps in it which I do not clearly understand (such as "we may set f 2 = 4k 2 m 2 ."). As Mahoney (1994) is the standard work on the mathematics of Fermat, however, we have renamed our variables in accordance to it, so that the proof of Mahoney (1994) is already roughly in accordance with our presentation here.
The discussion of the proof in Bussotti (2006) , Chapter 2.2.3, pp. 39-46, follows the interpretation of Mahoney (1994) , but elaborates the ways and means of the induction-hypothesis application, or more precisely, the indefinite descent. We read:
"From this demonstration, it is possible to deduce one of the most important properties inherent in every argument by indefinite descent: there is an invariable form with different orders of sizes [. . . ] .
[ Bussotti (2006) , p. 45]
As we have already discussed in § 2.4.4, from a refined logic-historical point of view, this "invariable form" may actually vary. This will become important in § 4.5 below, where we will discuss the only interpretation of Fermat's original proof that significantly differs from my presentation here, namely the one in Walsh (1928) .
Walsh's Alternative Interpretation
The only interpretation of Fermat's original proof that significantly differs from our presentation here is the one in Walsh (1928) . With the missing details added and the inconvincing parts removed, we may describe Walsh's interpretation roughly as follows.
Suppose that the clean-up of § 4.2 up to Claim I has been done. Then we continue as follows.
Claim III: There are some e, f, g, h ∈ N + with g, h coprime and x 2 e ≻ f ≻ 0 such that
Proof of Claim III: Set e := x 2 , f := 2x 3 , g := x 0 +x 1 , and h :
Moreover, we have e ≻ f by the following indirect proof: Otherwise, we would have 0 e 2 −f 2 = (x 0 −x 1 ) 2 , i.e. x 0 = x 1 , and as x 0 , x 1 are coprime, we would get x 0 = x 1 = 1, i.e. the contradictory 2 = x 2 2 . Finally, to show that g, h are coprime suppose z | x 0 +x 1 and z | |x 0 −x 1 | . As x 0 , x 1 are coprime, we get z 2 by Lemma 3.26(2). By Corollary 3.30 we know that x 0 +x 1 is odd. Thus, we get z = 1, as was to be shown.
Q.e.d. (Claim III) Compared to Claim II of § 4.2, the weakness of Claim III is that it only states x 2 e instead of x 2 ≻ e. This weaker statement, however, does not admit us to apply our induction hypothesis as before. This is not by chance and another weight function cannot help us, because the new triangle is actually the same as before: Indeed, we have x 2 = e = y 2 and {x 0 ,
2 , k 2 } = {y 0 , y 1 }. This means that-to arrive in proof state with a smaller weight-we actually have to descend the inductive reasoning cycle by proving Claim I and Claim II. The interesting aspect is that-as noted already in § 4.3-this is exactly what Fermat does in his proof. While these steps are superfluous according to all other interpretations, they are necessary according to the interpretation of Walsh (1928) .
Note that according to § 2.4.4 Walsh's proof is actually sound w.r.t. the following instantiation: In (ID ′ ) of § 2.4.4, roughly speaking, we set P 0 to Theorem 4.1, and P i to Claim II for all i ∈ N + . We measure P 0 with the weight x 2 2 +(2x 3 ) 2 +1. And we measure P i with the weight e 2 +f 2 for i ∈ N + , just as Fermat has described the weight in his original proof, cf. the 4 th paragraph of our annotated translation in § 4.3. From P 0 to P 1 the weight decreases by 1. And from P i to P i+1 the weight also decreases for i ∈ N + . A simpler way to see the soundness of this proof is to model it as a deductive proof of Theorem 4.1 with Claim II as a lemma, plus an inductive proof of Claim II.
We cannot decide whether the interpretation of Walsh (1928) for the first step of Fermat's proof (i.e. the Proof of Claim III) reflects Fermat's intentions regarding his original proof better than our presentation in § § 4.2 and 4.3. The interpretation of the actual indefinite descent of Fermat, however, is superior in Walsh's version. Moreover, notice that-considering Fermat's extreme conciseness in general-it is very likely that Fermat had believed the additional descent to be actually necessary. We cannot decide, however, whether this belief, which he later contradicted in his letter for Huygens in 1659 (cf. the end of our § 4.3), means that Walsh's interpretation is the correct one. This belief may be simply due to Fermat's inexperience with descente infinie at the time when he wrote his Observation XLV, more than 20 years before his death in 1665. The following dating of the Observations very roughly agrees with Goldstein (1995) 
Frénicle's More Elegant Version of Fermat's Proof
Note that geometric illustration cannot help much to understand the Proof of Theorem 4.1 in § 4.2.
The following seems to be the best we can get: The leftmost triangle is the originally assumed one and the rightmost triangle is the one to which the Modern Proof of Theorem 4.1 in § 4.2 descends. Although the one in the middle is rectangular by Claim I, it is not explicitly noted in Fermat's proof. In the proof of the same theorem in Frénicle (1676), however, Bernard Frénicle de Bessy (1602?-1675) descends to the same rightmost triangle but completely avoids application of Corollary 3.33 by an application of Lemma 3.31 to the rectangular triangle depicted in the middle. Omitting Claim II and all the following, the proof of Proposition XXXIX in Frénicle (1676) continues roughly as follows: We have (Claim I) q 2 +c 2 = p 2 , c is odd, p = e 2 , q = f 2 , x 2 ≻ e ≻ f ≻ 0, and p, q are coprime. By Lemma 3.31, there are m, k ∈ N + such that (2m 2 ) 2 +(k 2 ) 2 = p = e 2 . q.e.d. This is more elegant than Fermat's proof with an obviously and definitely different lemmatization, which, however, was sometimes neglected:
"Frénicle follows this proof [of Fermat ] faithfully, with little more than verbal changes [. . . ] . [Weil (1984) , § X, p. 77.]
As we are already exceeding the scope of this little paper and our margins are too small, we ask the reader who is interested in more information on the subject to have a look at Goldstein (1995) , which is a whole book dedicated to the history of Theorem 4.1, including a discussion of different interpretations of Fermat's Latin original and much more.
Conclusion
In § 2 we have discussed descente infinie from the mathematical, logical, historical, linguistic, and refined logic-historical points of view, providing some novel clarification of some methodological aspects of Descente Infinie.
Fermat gave his readers a hard time with his notes. Without experience in number theory it takes some days to reconstruct and to understand the proof. Our presentation here is self-contained and can be understood without any special knowledge on number theory. After all, Fermat wanted people to have fun with number theory. We have suggested to skip § 3, so that a non-expert reader may choose between the fun of exercise or the relief of solution.
We have provided a concise presentation of Fermat's proof which includes all important facts and which is easily accessible to laymen in history of mathematics. We consider it to be pedagogically advantageous to present the following three in the given order: the Latin original proof ( § 4.1), a modern self-contained proof ( § 4.2), and an English translation of the Latin original ( § 4.3). Independently of the order, this paper is-to our best knowledge-unique already in presenting the three. Moreover, it is-again to our best knowledge-also unique in annotating the English translation with references to a more explicit modern proof and not vice versa.
We have been laconic in § 4.3. Nevertheless-building on the detailed presentation of the modern proof in § 4.2-we are confident that the mathematical gestalt of Fermat's proof is perceivable with the help of the very sparse annotations in the translation of the original text in § 4.3. Moreover, we believe that this perception is easier and deeper than the one that can arise from a modern proof with annotations from (a translation of) the Latin original.
All in all, we thus hope that this paper will turn out to be especially helpful to a student to do a case study on this proof with our human-oriented inductive-theorem-proving software-system QUOD-LIBET, cf. Avenhaus &al. (2003) , Wirth (2004) , Wirth (2005) , Schmidt-Samoa (2006a), SchmidtSamoa (2006b), Schmidt-Samoa (2006c), Wirth (2006b) .
Aftermath
Finally, notice that Fermat's proof omits the little but important details of the proof, such as being positive, being coprime, or 2 ∤ p−q, which are an essential part of our modern proof in § 4.2. Moreover, he does not at all explicate the underlying theory, which we tried to reconstruct in § 3. As he seems to have found his proofs without pen and paper just in his imagination, he may have had some subconscious subroutines taking care of this. Such subroutines are error-prone and would explain Fermat's only claim that we know to be wrong, namely to have proved ∀n ∈ N.
(2 2 n +1 prime), contradicted by 5 = µn. ¬(2 2 n +1 prime) due to 2 7 5+1 | 2 2 5 +1. This claim of a proof occurs in the letter for Huygens, cf. our § 2.3. Five years before, in a letter to Pascal in August 1654, he had admitted that the proof was still incomplete, cf. Fermat (1891ff.), Vol. II, p. 309f.. Whether the proof Fermat claimed to have found for "Fermat's Last Theorem" ∀n 3. ∀x, y, z ∈ N + . (x n +y n = z n )
was also faulty for bigger n, or whether Fermat, the methodologist who after eighteen centuries was the first to apply the Method of Descente infinie again, invented yet another method for this proof, is still an open question.
